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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
AUTUMN 1995

VOLUME 47

NUMBER 1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. FOIA EXEMPTIONS NOT WAIVED WHEN PUBLIC BODY
FAILS TO RESPOND TO WRITTEN REQUESTS

In Litchfield Plantation Co. v. Georgetown County Water and Sewer
District' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the disclosure exemptions enumerated in South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 are
not waived by a public body's failure to respond to a written request for
information within the required fifteen-day period. 3 According to the court,
the disclosure exemptions provided by the FOIA are available to a public body
even after a request has been deemed approved by operation of the statute.'
This was a case of first impression in South Carolina.
The dispute between Georgetown County Water and Sewer District
(District) and Litchfield Plantation Co. (Litchfield) began in 1989, when the
District attempted to install a sewer line on Litchfield's property. Although
the District held a water and sewer easement on the property, Litchfield
objected to the installation. The District subsequently brought a declaratory
judgement action and an action for injunctive relief. The following month,
Litchfield made the first of five requests to the District under the FOIA. After
more than three weeks, the District responded to the first request by giving
Litchfield permission to copy and inspect records three weeks hence. Further
communications and delays followed. Litchfield then brought an action against
the District seeking to enjoin it from violating the FOIA and requesting
attorney fees. 5

1. - S.C. _, 443 S.E.2d 574 (1994).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994). See generally
DAvID E. SHIPLEY, SouTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. VIII (2d ed. 1989) (providing
a guide to South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act).
3. Litchfield PlantationCo., _ S.C. at __, 443 S.E.2d at 575.
4. Id. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 575. South Carolina Code § 30-4-30(c) provides: "If written
notification of the determination of the public body as to the availability of the requested public
record is neither mailed nor personally delivered to the person requesting the document within
the fifteen days allowed herein, the request must be considered approved." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 30-4-30(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
5. Litchfield Plantation Co., __ S.C. at __, 443 S.E.2d at 574-75.
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A special referee found the District guilty of violating the FOIA and
ordered it to comply with any requests not exempt under the statute. No
attorney fees were awarded. Litchfield appealed the special referee's findings
to the South Carolina Supreme Court, where the decision was affirmed; a
petition for rehearing was denied.6
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that, under South Carolina
Code section 30-4-30(a), 7 "[a]ny person has a right to inspect or copy any
public record of a public body except as otherwise provided by section 30-440."8 However, the court ruled that regardless of whether an agency
responds to a request as required by section 30-4-30(c), 9 the agency may still
claim the exemption benefits of section 30-4-40. According to the court,
approval by default is not approval of an entire request. Rather, it is an
approval only of the time and place of access for any nonexempt material
within a request. " In so holding, the majority reasoned that allowing
agencies to waive exemptions by failing to respond within fifteen days could
result in "the disclosure of investigative records of law enforcement agencies
and personal information. . . through no fault of an interested party which the
exemptions were enacted to protect.""
Justice Toal, alone in dissent, took issue with the court's interpretation of
South Carolina Code sections 30-4-30(a), 30-4-30(c), and 30-4-40.12 In
examining the plain meaning of the statute, she concluded that section 30-430(a) uses "except as otherwise provided by [section] 30-4-40 'to describe the
normal' implementation of the statute." 3 That is, if the response is made
within the allotted fifteen-day period, then the exemptions of section 30-4-40
apply. However, section 30-4-30(c) then provides that if the request is not
answered within fifteen days it is "considered approved." Because no special
provision relating to exemptions is provided for in that section, the plain
meaning of section 30-4-30(c) should dictate that requests be approved upon
agency failure to respond within fifteen days. 14
In addition to the plain wording of the statute, the dissent relied upon the
legislative intent and underlying policy of the FOIA in reaching its conclusion.
The legislature, in enacting the FOIA, found that "it is vital in a democratic

6. Id. at __, 443 S.E.2d at 574-75.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
8. Id.; see Litchfield Plantation Co., - S.C. at __, 443 S.E.2d at 575. Section 30-4-40
provides a list of those records exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. S.C. CODE ANN. § 304-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
10. Litchfield PlantationCo., - S.C. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 575.
11. Id.at _ n.1, 443 S.E.2d at 575 n.1.
12. Id.at _,443 S.E.2d at 576 (Toal, J., dissenting).
13. Id.at
, 443 S.E.2d at 576.
14. Id.at
443 S.E.2d at 576.
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society that public business be performed in an open and public manner so that
citizens shall be advised of the performance of public officials and of the
decisions that are reached in public activity and in the formulation of public
policy." 5 Section 30-4-15 instructs courts to construe the FOIA "so as to
make it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to learn and report fully
the activities of their public officials at a minimum cost or delay to the persons
seeking access to public documents or meetings." 6 Justice Toal concluded
that finding exemptions not claimed during the appropriate time period to have
been waived would be consistent with the General Assembly's intended policy
of maximum access with minimum delay. Thus, agencies would not be able
to procrastinate and still take advantage of the full exemptions, thereby
circumventing the purpose of the FOIA and the intent of the legislature. ' 7
In addition to the criticism expressed by the dissent, the court's decision
may be viewed as inconsistent with other FOIA cases decided by the court.
The court has consistently held that exemptions from disclosure allow a public
body the discretion to withhold certain materials from public disclosure.'
Because the exemptions are discretionary, an agency must determine whether
requested information could be considered exempt; then, the agency must
decide whether it will attempt to claim the protection provided by section 30-440.
In Bellamy v. Brown 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
sections 30-4-40 and 30-4-70 do not create a duty to keep information
confidential simply because such information is included under the exemptions
of the FOIA.
The Bellamy court viewed the exemption provisions as
optional, not as a mandatory bar to agency disclusure of information.2 '
Similarly, in South Carolina Tax Commission v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp.,' decided only months after Litchfield Plantation Co., the supreme
court again ruled that exemptions are not mandatory but, rather, are discretionary and require agency determination of whether they should be invoked.'
If Bellamy and Gaston Copper stand for the proposition that FOIA
exemptions are, in effect, optional and may be consciously waived by an
agency that decides not to invoke them, then arguably the plain language of
section 30-4-30(c) should be given effect and exemptions should be waived by

15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-15 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
16. Id.
17. Litchfield Plantation Co.,
S.C. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 576 (roal, J., dissenting).
18. South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., _ S.C. __,
447
S.E.2d 843, 846 (1994); Bellamy v. Brown, 305 S.C. 291, 295, 408 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1991).
19. 305 S.C. 291, 408 S.E.2d 219 (1991).
20. Id. at 295, 408 S.E.2d at 221.
21. Id.
22. __ S.C. _, 447 S.E.2d 843 (1994).
23. Id. at _, 447 S.E.2d at 846.
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operation of the notification provisions enumerated in that section. Put
somewhat differently, by enacting section 30-4-30(c), the General Assembly
arguably intended that agency failure to respond within the requisite time
frame be treated as the functional equivalent of an agency determination that
the request does not fall within an exemption, or, if it does, that the agency
does not intend to invoke the exception. Moreover, the South Carolina FOIA
is the only state statute of its kind with a default approval mechanism like
section 30-4-30(c). The express inclusion of this unique mechanism in the
Act further suggests that the legislature did not intend to provide
administrative agencies with an avenue to avoid public accountability by
ignoring FOIA requests while retaining the benefit of the statutory exemptions.
The impact of this decision is not yet apparent. Because, however, less
incentive exists for an agency to respond to requests for information in a
timely fashion, there is the potential for agencies increasingly to ignore FOIA
requests, frustrating efforts to access public records and creating the potential
for additional litigation and, ultimately, either judicial reconsideration of the
issue or legislative amendment of the act.
Pamela Dawn Baker
I. COURT RULES ON DISCOVERY AND EX PARTE
COMMUNICATIONS FOR CASES ARISING UNDER THE APA

In Ross v. Medical University of South Carolina' the South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that a circuit court may,
at its discretion, order discovery when reviewing cases arising under the South
Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA)2 if irregularities in the agency
proceeding are alleged.3 The court also held that ex parte communications
between an agency member serving in an adjudicative role and an agency
attorney serving in a prosecutorial role violate the APA and are not protected
by attorney-client privilege. 4
Paul Ross, M.D., a tenured professor at the Medical University of South
Carolina (MUSC), was fired by the president of MUSC for alleged abuse of

24. Some state statutes do not state a specific time period. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.03 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. §§ 16-4-202, 16-4-203 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
Other state statutes, as well as the federal FOIA, deem the failure to respond a denial. See, e.g.,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1988); IDAHO CODE § 9-339(1) & (2) (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.235(1) (West 1994).
1. -_ S.C. _, 453 S.E.2d 880 (1994).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1993).
3. Ross, _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 883.
4. Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 885.
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his official position for personal financial gain.5 Utilizing MUSC's three-step
grievance process, Ross lodged a complaint, which the vice president for
academic affairs referred to a faculty hearing committee (Committee).6 The
Committee upheld the termination. The vice president reviewed and concurred
in the Committee's decision. Finally, Ross appealed to the MUSC board of
trustees, which reviewed the case and upheld the termination. 7 Ross then
sought review in circuit court as allowed under the APA.' His challenge to
the procedure was based upon the vice president's dual role as a prosecutor
and judge,' improper communications between the vice president and MUSC's
general counsel, and the intentional failure of MUSC to give the final page of
the faculty report to Ross or his counsel. 10

When Ross served requests for admissions on MUSC, MUSC moved for
a protective order on two grounds. First, it argued that discovery was not
proper because the court's review was limited to the agency record. Second,
because the requests related to communications between the vice president and
the MUSC general counsel, MUSC alleged that the information was protected
by the attorney-client privilege."
The circuit court rejected both arguments, and after MUSC still refused
to answer, the court deemed the requests admitted. Further, the judge held
MUSC in contempt and imposed sanctions." The South Carolina Court of
Appeals, however, agreed with MUSC that the circuit court lacked the power
to order discovery.' 3 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, upholding
the circuit court's order and imposition of sanctions. It further held that the

, 453 S.E.2d at 881.
5. Id. at
6. Id. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 883.
7. Id. at _,453 S.E.2d at 881.
8. Ross, _ S.C. at__, 453 S.E.2d at 881-82; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994). Ross originally filed suit in circuit court for violation of due process,
breach of contract, accord and satisfaction, and review under the APA. The suit was removed
to federal court, which remanded the APA review back to the circuit court. The federal court
retained jurisdiction over the other causes of action. Ross, _ S.C. at_, 453 S.E.2d at 88182.
9. Ross alleged that the vice president conducted the initial investigation and recommended
to the president that Ross be terminated. Brief of Petitioner at 2.
10. Ross, __ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 883. MUSC did not dispute that one page was
intentionally kept from Ross, but contended that the page was a separate confidential document
that was not part of the Committee's report. See Brief of Respondent at 8.
11. Ross, _ S.C. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 882.
, 453 S.E.2d at 882.
12. Id. at
, 435 S.E.2d 877, 879 (Ct.
13. Ross v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, _ S.C. _,
App. 1993), rev'd, _ S.C. _, 453 S.E.2d 880 (1994). Because the court of appeals vacated
the circuit court's order compelling MUSC to answer the requests for admission, it did not need
to reach the issue of whether the information was protected by attorney-client privilege.
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attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between MUSC's
vice president and general counsel.14
The authority of the circuit court to review the action of the MUSC Board
of Directors is provided by the APA, which requires that "[t]he review...
shall be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the
court." 5 In holding that the circuit court could not order discovery, the court
of appeals stressed that "under the Administrative Procedures Act, the circuit
court is not a trial court of original jurisdiction, but a reviewing court with
jurisdiction only to affirm, reverse, or modify the agency's decision on those
grounds expressly authorized by the Act."16 In a footnote, the court of
appeals made reference to the statutory provision allowing additional proof
"[ifn the limited case of alleged irregularity in procedure before the agency not
shown in the record," 17 but did not explain why it found the provision
inapplicable. Instead, the court of appeals reasoned that review of an agency
decision does not constitute an "action" within the meaning of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and that discovery devices provided by the
Rules were therefore unavailable.'"
The supreme court, however, noting that allegations of procedural
irregularity had been made, concluded that the "plain and ordinary meaning"
of the statute is that a circuit court may, at its discretion, "take proof"
itself.'9 Therefore, the court reasoned, a lower court may order discovery.
MUSC argued that allowing proof to be taken in court is not the same as a
grant of authority to order discovery. 2' Indeed, none of the cases cited by
the supreme court to support its conclusion involved discovery. One case
involved the proffer of testimony to prove irregularities; 2' another involved
holding an evidentiary hearing to investigate an alleged conflict of interest.'
It is possible, then, that the court has given a more expansive interpretation
than the plain meaning of the statute demands.' Nevertheless, the holding
14. Ross, _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 885.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
16. Ross v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, __ S.C. at_, 435 S.E.2d at 879 (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (Law. Co-op. 1986) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23380(A)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994))).
17. Id. at _ n.4, 435 S.E.2d at 879 n.4 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(f) (current
version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994))).
18. Id. at
, 435 S.E.2d at 878-79.
19. Ross, _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 882.
20. See Brief of Respondent at 13.
21. SeeAdriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 596 A.2d 426,431 (Conn.
1991).
22. See.Brunswick v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 617 A.2d 466,468 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
23. The court acknowledged that it had not previously interpreted the phrase "proof thereon
may be taken in the court." Ross, __ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 882. For the general rule that
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of the court is consistent with a court's inherent power to ensure the fair and
orderly disposition of matters before it.' If parties are allowed to present
new evidence, it follows that they should be allowed the tools to uncover that
evidence.
The second issue decided by the supreme court was whether the
information sought through the discovery request was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. As a foundation for its decision on this issue, the
court considered Ross's allegations of improper communications between the
vice president and general counsel, which included the accusation that the
general counsel prepared the vice president's written concurrence in the
Committee report. The requests for admission served by Ross on MUSC were

an attempt to substantiate these allegations.'
Before deciding the attorney-client privilege issue, the court considered
the propriety of the agency's actions under section 1-23-360 of the APA:26
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law,
members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case shall not
communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact,
with any person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with
any party or his representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all
parties to participate. An agency member:
(1)

May communicate with other members of the agency;
and

discovery is limited in the review of agency decisions, see 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law
§ 584 (1994). See also Fisher v. Iowa Bd. of Optometry Examiners, 478 N.W.2d 609, 611

(Iowa 1991) (noting that a court in an appellate capacity normally has no authority to order
discovery).

24. See Greenfield v. Greenfield, 245 S.C. 604, 610, 141 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1965).
25. Ross, _ S.C. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 884. The requests to admit that MUSC refused to
answer on the grounds of attorney-client privilege were as follows:
5. When [Vice President] consulted with [General Counsel] concerning the
recommendation of the Faculty Hearing Committee, [Vice President] requested that
[General Counsel] prepare a document stating his agreement with the Faculty Hearing
Committee's recommendation. [General Counsel] did prepare that document.
7. In consultation and discussion between [Vice President] and [General Counsel]
following the receipt by [Vice President] of the Faculty Hearing Committee's
recommendation of November 29, 1989, and before [Vice Prescient] signed the
document evidencing his approval of the Faculty Hearing Committee's recommendation, there was discussion between [Vice President] and [General Counsel] with
respect to page 5, entitled "Comments," of the submission of the Faculty Hearing
Committee.
Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 884 (alterations in original).
26. Id. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 884.
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May have the aid and advice of one or more personal
assistants.27

The supreme court regarded the vice president as a person assigned to
render a decision because of his role as intermediate judge in the three-step
process. The court held, therefore, that he "was prohibited from discussing
the case ex parte with MUSC's General Counsel," who represented MUSC in
prosecuting the case before the Committee.' Having determined that the
communication itself was improper, the court concluded that the attorney-client
privilege provides no protection. "Not every communication within the
attorney and client relationship is privileged. The public policy protecting
confidential communications must be balanced against the public interest in the
proper administration of justice." 2 9 Furthermore, "whether the privilege
applies is within the sound discretion of the trial judge
and his decision will
30
not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion."
MUSC argued that because the statute allows an agency member to
communicate with other members of the agency, the communications between
its vice president and general counsel were not improper. 31 But the supreme
court ruled that MUSC's argument "ignore[d] the plain language of the statute
which proscribes ex parte communications relating to a contested case between
the agency 'judge' and a party's counsel. "32
The court's interpretation of the statute is supported, but not necessarily
compelled by the plain language of the provision. The statute could be read
as proscribing communication between the decision maker and a person, party,
or representative except that the decision maker may communicate with other
agency members. Thus, under this interpretation, an agency member could
never be a person, party, or a party's representative. Or, as the supreme court
read it, the statute might proscribe communication between the decision maker
and a person, party, or party's representative, but allow communication
between the decision maker and agency members other than those who are
parties or representatives.
A statutory exception to a rule prohibiting ex parte communications that
allows communication with other agency members would not be unusual. For

27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-360 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
28. Ross, _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 884.
29. Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting State v. Doster, 276 S.C. 647, 651, 284 S.E.2d
218, 220, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981)).
30. Id. at_, 453 S.E.2d at 885 (citing State v. Love, 275 S.C. 55, 271 S.E.2d 110, cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980)).
31. Id. at _,
32. Id. at _,

453 S.E.2d at 884.
453 S.E.2d at 884.
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example, a similar provision in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act33
states:
[N]o member of the body comprising the agency ... who is or may
reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the
proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any interested
person outside the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the merits
of the proceeding. 4
Another provision of the federal law prevents those who perform investigative
or prosecutorial functions from participating or advising in decision-making,
but states that the provision "does not apply . . . to the agency or a member
or members of the body comprising the agency." 35 Such statutory exceptions
are consistent with the United States Supreme Court's view that the dual roles
performed by agency members who investigate and adjudicate are not
inherently unfair. 6
The supreme court, however, indicated that an agency member acting in
a judicial capacity was not entitled to confer with an agency member acting as
a prosecutor.3 7 The court also noted that violators of the statute are subject
to criminal sanctions38 and reinstated the order of the circuit court holding
MUSC in contempt. 9
By finding a clear violation of the statutory prohibition against ex parte
communications, the supreme court easily dispensed with the claim of
attorney-client privilege. Therefore, Ross in no way limits the existing scope
of the privilege. By deciding the issue on statutory grounds, the court
provided no. discussion on whether the performance of a dual role as
investigator and adjudicator by the MUSC vice president was itself improper.
After Ross, however, administrative agencies may be facing two stricter rules
when their decisions are subject to judicial review. First, a court's broad
discretion in determining the manner in which it will receive evidence has
been affirmed. Second, a court may strictly construe any communication

33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), (C) (1994).
36. For a summary of the Court's view, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 456-55 (1975).
For a discussion on the separation of functions in administrative agencies, see generally 2
KENNETH C. DAvis & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.9 (1994).
37. Ross, _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 884.
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-360 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (providing that "[a]ny person who
violates the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be fined not more than two hundred fifty dollars or imprisoned for not more than

six months").
39. Ross,

_

S.C. at _,

453 S.E.2d at 885.
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between an agency decision maker and an agency attorney representing the
agency as a violation of the APA.
Jerry H. Evans
III. COURT REINFORCES WIDE DISCRETION AFFORDED

SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARDS OF TRUSTEES
In Redmond v. Lexington County School District No. Four' the South
Carolina Supreme Court once again recognized the broad decision-making
powers vested in school district boards of trustees. The court held that the
Board of Trustees for Lexington County School District No. Four (Board) did
not abuse its discretion when it approved a lease-purchase agreement to
construct a new school even though the agreement effectively nullified an
earlier referendum in which voters rejected a bond issue for construction of the
school. The court also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
selecting a site for the school that opponents claimed contained environmental
hazards. 2 Finally, the court interpreted a state regulation3 requiring school
boards to maintain school buildings as discretionary rather than ministerial,
and thus refused to issue a writ of mandamus forcing the repair of existing
schools. 4 Redmond is in harmony with the court's prior rulings, as well as
the weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
The Board put forth a bond referendum to the voters of Lexington County
School District No. Four (District) to approve funds for the construction of a
new middle school.5 Voter approval of the bonds was required because the
funding would have exceeded debt limitations established by Article X, Section
15 of the South Carolina Constitution. 6 The bond referendum was defeated.
According to the appellants, owners of property in the District (Property
Owners), the Board indicated that if the bond referendum was defeated it
would consider other options, such as doubling the sessions at the high school,
merging the eighth grade into high school, or raising taxes to repair existing
facilities. 7 However, instead of enacting these options after the voters
rejected the bond referendum, the Board approved a lease-purchase agreement
to finance construction of the new school.'

1. __ S.C. _, 445 S.E.2d 441 (1994).
2. Redmond, - S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 445.
3. S.C. CODE REGs. 43-180 (1992).
4. Redmond, _ S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 445.
5. Id. at -,
445 S.E.2d at 442.
6. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 15.
7. Brief of Appellants at 11.
8. Id.
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The Property Owners filed a class action suit against the Board and the
District to block the lease-purchase agreement, asserting that this method of
financing was an abuse of the Board's discretion because it nullified the earlier
vote of the District's electors. 9 They also argued that the Board abused its
discretion because the lease-purchase agreement was more expensive than
bonded indebtedness, and that had the Board informed the voters that it was
contemplating the lease-purchase alternative, the voters would have approved
the bonds.'
The Property Owners maintained that the District's tax base was
insufficient to support the expansion, that per pupil expenditures for instruction
were second lowest in the state, and that construction costs would further
decrease per pupil expenditures." They also claimed that, due to a present
shortage of funding, existing schools in the district were not being maintained.' Lastly, the Property Owners alleged that the site selected for the
of Health
new school was near an area cited by the South Carolina Department
13
and Environmental Control for environmental infractions.
The Property Owners requested a temporary injunction order to prevent
the Board from entering into the lease-purchase agreement until the tax base
became adequate to finance the new school. 4 In addition, they asked for a
writ of mandamus to compel the District to repair existing schools and to reopen another school.' 5
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision granting
the District's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. 6 The
court began by reaffirming the use of lease-purchase agreements even though
they effectively circumvent Article X, Section 15, which specifies that a school
district may not incur general obligation debt over eight percent of the
district's assessed property value without voter approval. 7 General obligation debt is defined as "any indebtedness of the school district which shall be
secured in whole or in part by a pledge of its full faith, credit and taxing
power. " " In Caddell v. Lexington County School District No. P'9 the court
previously held that lease-purchase agreements do not constitute general
obligation debt.

9. Redmond, _ S.C. at __, 445 S.E.2d at 442-43.
10. Id. at __, 445 S.E.2d at 444.
11. Brief of Appellants at 3-5.
12. Redmond, _ S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 443.
13. Brief of Appellants at 4.
14. Redmond, _ S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 443.
, 445 S.E.2d at 443.
15. Id. at
16. Id. at _, 445 j.E.2d at 442.
17. S.C. CONsT. art. X, § 15(6).
18. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 15(2).
19. 296 S.C. 397, 373 S.E.2d 598 (1988).
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Justice Finney dissented in both Caddell and Redmond. In Caddell he
concluded that "the test should be whether the indebtedness of the school
district is 'secured in whole or in part by a pledge of its full faith, credit and
taxing power.'"'2 According to Justice Finney, because lease-purchase agreements "show that the indebtedness is secured in part by the school district's
property, which was acquired by its taxing powers," 2 lease-purchase
agreements are a general obligation debt and thus "violate the letter and the
spirit of Article X, Section 15."'
Justice Finney noted in Redmond
that the Property Owners had not questioned the constitutionality of the
arrangement, but had questioned the Board's use of it under the circumstances. 23
Nevertheless, the supreme court reaffirmed the constitutionality of leasepurchase agreements in Redmond, concluding that it was for the legislature to
decide whether to classify lease-purchase agreements as general obligation
debt.' The court noted that the South Carolina General Assembly had a bill
before it that would require amounts expended for lease-purchase agreements
to be counted toward general obligation debt, but determined that until such
legislation is passed, the court was obligated to follow precedent.' In fact,
the Governor recently signed a bill which provides that lease-purchase
agreements entered into by school districts after December 31, 1995, must be
approved through a bond referendum if the principal balance of the leasepurchase agreement plus any other outstanding indebtedness of the school
district not approved through a bond referendum exceeds eight percent of the
assessed value of taxable property in the school district.26 The bond referendum requirement also covers any renewals or extensions of lease-purchase
agreements. 27 Regardless, the court's decision is in accord with the majority
of jurisdictions that have considered the issue.2"
9
The court relied on Gamble v. Williamsburg County School DistricP
to
hold that the Board's decision to finance the construction of the school through

20. Id. at 403, 373 S.E.2d at 601 (Finney, J., dissenting) (quoting City ofBeaufort v. Griffin,
275 S.C. 603, 605, 274 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1981)).
21. Id.
22. Id. For a thorough analysis of Caddell,see 2 JAMEs L. UNDERWOOD, THE CONsTrruTION
OF Soum CAROLINA: THE JOURNEY TowARD LOCAL SELF-GovERNMENT 144-45 (1989).

23. Redmond, __ S.C. at __, 441 S.E.2d at 445 (Finney, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at __,445 S.E.2d at 443.
25. Id. at __, 445 S.E.2d at 443.
26. Act of June 7, 1995, S. 48 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-27-110).
27. Id.
28. See Susan A. Fretwell, Case Note, Court Holds Use ofLease/PurchaseAgreements To
FinanceBuilding of PublicSchool Not Violative of ConstitutionalLimit on Long Term Debt, 41
S.C. L. REV. 11, 13 n.19 (1989).
29. 305 S.C. 288, 408 S.E.2d 217 (1991).
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a lease-purchase agreement was not an abuse of discretion.3"

The court

reasoned that because the Board was charged with managing the school
district,31 the question of whether a board properly exercises its power 2 is
"whether the action measures up to any fair test of reason, and that a clear
abuse of discretion is required to justify judicial interference. "33
In Gamble the supreme court considered whether a board's decision to
close a high school and transfer its students to other schools while closing an
elementary school and transferring those students to the vacated high school
building was an abuse of discretion.34 Although some parents claimed that
their children would have to travel farther under the new design, the court
used the "fair test of reason analysis" and refused to interfere with the board's
decision because there was no clear abuse of discretion.35 The court noted
that the elementary school building needed repairs, which the board could not
afford, and that the consolidation of schools would result in savings due to
reductions in salaries and fringe benefits. Furthermore, the students would
benefit from the wider curriculums offered at the larger high schools.36
The court also rejected the Property Owners' argument that the Board's
failure to disclose that they were considering the lease-purchase alternative was
an abuse of discretion. The Property Owners claimed that the District would

30. Redmond, _ S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 444.
31. South Carolina Code § 59-19-10 provides that school districts "shall be under the
management and control of the board of trustees provided for in this article, subject to the
supervision and orders of the county board of education." S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-19-10 (Law.
Co-op. 1990).
32. South Carolina Code § 59-19-90 provides that school boards shall:
(1) Provideschoolhouses.Provide suitable schoolhouses in its district and make
them comfortable, paying due regard to any schoolhouse already built or site
procured, as well as to all other circumstances proper to be considered so
as best to promote the educational interest of the districts;
(5) Control school property. Take care of, manage and control the school
property of the district;
(7) Controleducationalinterestofdistrict.Manage and control local educational
interests of its district, with the exclusive authority to operate or not to
operate any public school or schools.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-19-90 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
33. Redmond, _ S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 444 (citing Gamble, 305 S.C. at 290, 408
S.E.2d at 218).
34. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 289-90, 408 S.E.2d at 218.
35. Id. at 290, 408 S.E.2d at 218 (citing Sarratt v. Cash, 103 S.C. 531, 88 S.E. 256 (1916));
see also Singleton v. Horry County Sch. Dist., 289 S.C. 223, 227-28, 345 S.E.2d 751, 753-54
(Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that courts will not interfere with a school board's
judgment unless "there is clear evidence that the board has acted corruptly, in bad faith, or in
clear abuse of its powers") (citing Coggins v. Board of Educ., 28 S.E.2d 527 (N.C. 1944)).
36. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 290, 408 S.E.2d at 218.
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not have incurred as high a financial burden had the Board actually selected
the options it allegedly claimed it would select if the bond referendum was
defeated.3 7 In reaching its conclusion on this issue, the court relied heavily
on Sarrattv. Cash.38
In Sarratt the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the board from
building a school on a certain site because they claimed that when the board
solicited voter approval it represented that the school would be built at another
location.39 The court held that it was against public policy to permit board
members to bind themselves by "promise or representation to . . . electors
of. . . the district so that they could not, at all times, act freely and
impartially. ... "40 Therefore, the Sarrattcourt concluded that the plaintiffs
could not legally rely on the alleged representations.41
In Redmond the Property Owners claimed that the Board's failure to
disclose that it would consider a lease-purchase agreement was an abuse of
discretion. That is, the Redmond Property Owners, in effect, advanced an
alternative argument: that the Board had a duty to inform the voters that the
lease-purchase alternative would be pursued if the voters rejected the bond
referendum. The court could have supplemented its reliance on Sarratt by
stating that the Board had no affirmative duty to disclose its alternatives in the
event the bond referendum was rejected. Under the South Carolina statutory
and constitutional scheme,42 the Board clearly was not required to disclose
the alternatives it would consider if a bond referendum was rejected.
The fair test of reason analysis used in Redmond and Gamble to determine
whether a school board properly exercises its discretion is similar to the ample
basis test used by other courts. 43 Under that test, a court will not interfere
with a board's decision unless a plaintiff can prove that the board did not have
an ample basis for the decision. For example, in Browning v. Board of
Education" the Kentucky Court of Appeals dismissed the appellants'
contentions that the board abused its discretion in choosing a school site even
though the appellants cited specific reasons why other sites were better. The

37. Brief of Appellants at 11.
38. 103 S.C. 531, 88 S.E. 256 (1916).
39. Id. at 533, 88 S.E. at 257.
S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 444 (quoting Sarratt, 103 S.C. at 536, 88 S.E.
40. Redmond,_
at 258).
41. Sarratt,103 S.C. at 536, 88 S.E. at 258.
42. See S.C. CONST., art. X, § 15; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-10 to -340 (Law. Co-op.
1990).
43. Browning v. Board of Educ., 291 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); see Espinal v. Salt
Lake City Bd. of Educ., 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990); PHILIP K. PIELE & JAMES R. FORSBERG,
SCHOOL PROPERTY: THE LEGALrY OF ITS USE AND DIsPosITION 6 (1974).
44. 291 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
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court refused to interfere with the board's judgment because the board relied
on experts, thus providing it with an ample basis for its decision.4'
46 the Supreme
Similarly, in Espinal v. Salt Lake City Board of Education
Court of Utah concluded that a board's decision to realign high school
boundaries was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Rather, the court held that
the board's action was thoughtful and deliberate47 because it hired outside
consultants and made its decision after months of study and public input.4"
The Redmond court also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion
in choosing a new school site49 even though the Property Owners claimed
that the site was not suitable due to environmental problems.5" The court,
following cases from neighboring jurisdictions,5" concluded that because the
selection of school sites is in the discretion of local authorities, unless the
Board violated some law or grossly abused its discretion, the court will not
interfere with the Board's judgment.52 Whether the Board's decision would
have satisfied a thorough application of an ample basis test or a fair test of
reason analysis is unclear. Either of the tests would have forced the court to
consider why the Board's selection of the site was justified and, thus, address
the Property Owners' allegations that the site was ill-suited because of alleged
environmental problems. Although the court did not indicate any basis for the
Board's decision, such as reliance on expert opinions or a thorough study of
the site's suitability, its decision is in accord with the weight of authority
elsewhere.53
The court refused to issue a writ of mandamus54 to compel the Board to
45. Id. at 19.
46. 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990).
47. Id. at 414.
48. Id. at 415 (citing Allen v. Board of Edi'c., 236 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1951) (holding that
a board's decision to close a school was appropriate because it was made "after a careful survey
of the educational needs of the district")).
49. Redmond, __ S.C. at __, 445 S.E.2d at 444-45.
50. Id. at __, 445 S.E.2d at 443.
51. See Smith v. Ouzts, 103 S.E.2d 567, 569 (Ga. 1958); McKenzie v. Walker, 78 S.E.2d
486, 487 (Ga. 1953); Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Lewis, 58 S.E.2d 725, 727 (N.C. 1950).
52. Redmond, - S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 444-45.
53. See Arthur v. Oceanside-Carlsbad Junior College Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 177, 179 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Board of Directors v. Jeffrey, 370 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Colo. 1962); Smith v. Ouzts,
103 S.E.2d 567, 569 (Ga. 1958); Baker v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 346, 480 P.2d 409, 412 (Kan.
1971); Brown v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962);
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. City of New Orleans, 468 So. 2d 709, 711-12 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 472 So. 2d 593 (La. 1985); Educational Fin. Comm'n v. Jackson County Sch. Dist., 415
So. 2d 680, 685-86 (Miss. 1982); Painter v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 217 S.E.2d 650, 657
(N.C. 1975); Mid Valley Taxpayers Ass'n v. Mid Valley Sch. Dist., 416 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa.
1980); Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 159 (W. Va. 1981); LEROY J. PETERSON ET AL., THE
LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION § 9.3c at 205 (2d ed. 1978); 1 WILLIAM D. VALENTE,
EDUCATION LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE § 4.2 at 78 (1985).

54. For South Carolina courts to issue a writ of mandamus, applicants must show that (1)
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repair existing schools or to reopen another.55 The Property Owners claimed
that the Board violated a South Carolina regulation56 which provides that
school buildings shall be maintained, safe, and attractive and shall be kept
clean and comfortable. 57
Considering the propriety of a writ of mandamus, the court set out the
differences between an act that is ministerial and one that is discretionary or
quasi-judicial. An act "is ministerial if it is defined by law with such precision
as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion."" Conversely, a quasijudicial or discretionary act "requires the exercise of reason in the adaptation
of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall
be done or the course pursued." 5 9
Although the regulation used the word "shall," the court concluded that
the act was discretionary or quasi-judicial because the Board would have to
exercise its discretion in selecting which repairs should be made based on
priority and budget restraints.' Therefore, the court refused to issue a writ
of mandamus because it would not replace the Board's discretionary judgment
with its own in deciding which repairs were appropriate. 6'
Similar conclusions have been reached in other jurisdictions. For example,
in Meyer v. Carman62 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a statute
requiring the school board to keep school grounds safe was discretionary. The
court aptly stated that "[a]t first blush it might appear that the duty to keep the
school grounds 'safe' is ministerial in character, but it is apparent on closer
analysis that a great many circumstances may need to be considered in
deciding what action is necessary .... "6 As a result, such decisions by the
board "involve the exercise of. . . discretion rather than the mere performance of a prescribed task. " 64
The court's conclusions in Redmond give school boards wide latitude in
their decision-making. South Carolina is not alone in this respect; courts have

respondent had a duty to perform the act; (2) the act is ministerial in nature; (3) they have a
specific legal right for which the discharge of the duty is necessary; and (4) they have no other
legal remedy available. Willimon v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 82, 87, 132 S.E.2d 169, 171

(1963).
55. Redmond, __ S.C. at _,

445 S.E.2d at 445.

56. See S.C. CODE REGS. 43-180 (1992).

57. Redmond, - S.C. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 445.
58. Id. at _, 445 S.E.2d at 445 (citing Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Social Servs.,
304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615 (1991); Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659
(1973)(per curiam); and Godwin v. Carrigan, 227 S.C. 216, 87 S.E.2d 471 (1955)).
59. Id. at __,445 S.E.2d at 445.
60. Id. at , 445 S.E.2d at 445.
61. Id. at_, 445 S.E.2d at 445.
62. 73 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1955).
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id.
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rarely interfered with a school board's judgment unless a plaintiff can show a
clear abuse of discretion. Even though school boards "are subject to suit at
the whim of a plaintiff, such suits are not successful unless school board
members have been guilty of some wrongful conduct, or have failed to follow
statutory or other legal requirements or procedures. "I
Redmond sends and
reinforces an already strong signal to aggrieved parties: unless they can show
by clear evidence that a school board violated some law or manifestly abused
its discretion, their chance of success is slim. These odds will only improve
when the legislature delineates stricter standards for local school districts and
school boards, as it recently did with regard to lease-purchase agreements in
response to the Redmond decision.'
Demetri K. Koutrakos

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES MUST BE EXHAUSTED ABSENT
CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTING AN EXCEPTION TO EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

Administrative agencies and procedures have a unique relationship with
the judiciary. As a general rule, when an adequate administrative procedure
exists, individuals must exhaust that remedy before they seek judicial review.I
But courts have not consistently required compliance with the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies unless exhaustion is statutorily mandated.2 In Hyde
v. South CarolinaDepartment of Mental Health3 the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered whether exhaustion is required when a statute is silent on the
issue, holding that an employee seeking damages under the state Whistleblower
Statute4 was required to exhaust administrative remedies available under the
State Employee Grievance Procedure Act5 prior to bringing the whistleblower
action. In so holding, the court noted that unless the trial judge finds
circumstances supporting an exception to the general rule of exhaustion, the
party seeking access to the courts must "pursue the administrative remedy or
be precluded from relief in the courts." 6

65. Marlin M. Volz, Remedies Against School Boards and School Board Members as to
Records and Procedures, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SCHOOL BOARDS § 3.11 at 50 (Arthur A.
Rezny ed., 1966).
66. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
1. See Thompson v. Springs Mills, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 651 (D.S.C. 1982).
2. See United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 412 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969).
3. _ S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 582 (1994).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-17-310 to -380 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1994).
6. Hyde, _ S.C. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 583.
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Dr. Alexander Hyde was employed as a psychiatrist by the South Carolina
Department of Mental Health (SCDMH). In November 1991, while working
at Bryan Psychiatric Hospital, Dr. Hyde reported alleged violations of
department policy and state and federal law. 7 The report alleged that the
SCDMH had unlawfully requested that doctors change patient diagnoses so
that costs for treatment would be reimbursable. The report also asserted that
wealthy patients received more favorable treatment than their poorer
counterparts. The report further alleged that an involuntarily committed
patient had been wrongfully detained. Finally, Dr. Hyde charged the SCDMH
with employing an incompetent physician, failing to supervise, and failing to
correct improper patient management.8
Dr. Hyde claimed that, as a result of his report, the SCDMH retaliated
by imposing harsh restrictions on him, by encouraging colleagues to complain
about him, and by threatening him. 9 In addition, the doctor claimed that the
SCDMH changed the scope of his duties and stripped him of former positions
in a deliberate effort to worsen his working environment. Consequently, Dr.
Hyde resigned from the SCDMH.' 0
In March 1992, Dr. Hyde filed a complaint against the SCDMH under
South Carolina's "Whistleblower Statute.""
Under the Whistleblower
Statute, a public employee who is fired, demoted, suspended, or who receives
a decrease in compensation after reporting alleged wrongdoing may bring an
action against the employing public body. 2 Hyde requested $500,000 in
actual damages for loss of earnings, earning capacity, and reputation, as well
as for physical illness, emotional distress, and attorney's fees. When Hyde
filed suit, the Whistleblower Statute did not expressly require employees to
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the judicial process.
As an affirmative defense, SCDMH pointed out that Hyde failed to resort
to South Carolina's employee grievance procedure. 3 SCDMH asserted that
Hyde's judicial action was barred by his failure to first file a complaint with
the Employee Grievance Committee.' 4 The trial judge struck the defense,
stating that without an express statutory requirement, exhaustion of administrative remedies was a matter of judicial discretion. 5
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision, holding that "[w]here an adequate administrative remedy is available

7. Record at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-17-330 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1994).
14. Record at 10.
15. Id.
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to determine a question of fact, one must pursue the administrative remedy or
be precluded from seeking relief in the courts." 6 Moreover, the court held
that a person must first exhaust administrative remedies, even in the absence
of an express statutory requirement, unless circumstances justifying an
exception excuse the exhaustion requirement. A subsequent amendment to the
Whistleblower Statute requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies was
found to demonstrate legislative intent to preclude initial appeal to the court
17
system.
Justice Toal dissented, noting that Hyde's suit was filed prior to the 1993
amendment to the WhistIeblower Act. She argued that the legislature clearly
did not intend for the restriction to apply to claims brought before the
amendment.1 The legislative history shows that the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies took effect on June 21, 1993, and applied
"with respect to any personnel actions taken after that date." 9 Thus, Justice
Toal opined that the majority misread the legislative history and failed to apply
the legislature's actual intent. According to the dissent, although subsequent
claims were required to exhaust administrative remedies before judicial action,
claims brought prior to the amendment's effective date were not.'
Although not discussed to any degree in Hyde, the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine has several important functions. First, the exhaustion doctrine allows
factual issues to be determined by agencies that specialize in a particular area.
Among others, Justice Douglas has emphasized the role of administrative
agencies, stating that "[tlhreshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an
administrative agency are appropriately routed to the agency."21 Second,
judicial deference to administrative remedies provides a more uniform
approach to issues within an agency's jurisdiction. Requiring first resort to
administrative procedures creates "uniformity and consistency in the regulation
of business entrusted to a particular agency."I Allowing various courts and
an agency to concurrently interpret the agency's policies would likely result
in conflicting decisions. Requiring exhaustion of administrative procedures
reduces the number of authorities involved in the interpretation of policies and
thereby increases the predictability of, and reliance on, agency decisions.
The third purpose of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is to protect
administrative agencies. The exhaustion doctrine facilitates more efficient

16. Hyde v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, _ S.C. _, _,442 S.E.2d 582, 583
(1994) (citations omitted).
17. Id. at __ n.2, 442 S.E.2d at 583 n.2.
18. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 583 (Toal, J., dissenting).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) (originally enacted as 1993 S.C.
Acts 164, Part II, § 37E).
20. Hyde, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 584 (Toal, J., dissenting).
21. Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973).
22. Id.
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agency actions. An agency can streamline its operations by limiting the appeal
and review of an administrative decision.' Also, the exhaustion doctrine
allows an agency to correct its own errors.2' Administrative procedures call
to scrutiny a mistake made by the agency and afford the opportunity to correct
the mistake without resorting to judicial review. The agency may then handle
the matter according to its own policies.' Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine
protects agencies by reducing costs. "Litigation costs and judicial intervention
may so stifle a new and unfolding agency program that its fruition . . . is
defeated." 2 6 An agency's allocated funds could be quickly depleted if it were
constantly required to appear in court to defend or assert its policies. The
exhaustion doctrine reduces the loss of funds to court costs by forcing
adherence to statutory procedures or administrative policies. More generally,
the exhaustion doctrine protects a legislatively established agency by
recognizing and respecting the agency's autonomy.27
The fourth purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to benefit the courts by
reducing the docket load, providing a record in case of subsequent judicial
review, and allowing the court to draw from an agency's expertise. "[The
exhaustion doctrine] prevents having an overworked court consider issues and
remedies available through administrative channels."2 8 Additionally, initial
resort to the administrative process might result in a favorable determination
for the claimant, eliminating the need for judicial review of the individual's
claim.
As pointed out earlier, the Hyde decision held that, absent circumstances
supporting an exception, available administrative remedies must be exhausted
before seeking judicial review even in the absence of an express statutory
exhaustion requirement.29 Although judges may exercise discretion if there
is "a sound basis for excusing the failure to exhaust administrative relief,"30
the court did not enumerate circumstances that would justify waiver of the
exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion requirement obviously does not apply
when no administrative procedure exists.31 Similarly, once administrative

23. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12.9 (1993).
24. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
25. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
26. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 23, at 404-05.
27. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193.
28. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board ofEqualization, 493 U.S. 378, 397 (1990) (citations
omitted).
29. Hyde v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, __ S.C. __, __,442 S.E.2d 582, 583
(1994).
30. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 583.
31. See Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Sackheim, 451 F. Supp. 1181, 1186 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (holding that judicial review did not violate an agency's autonomy where no administrative
procedures existed).
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processes have been exhausted, individuals are free to seek judicial review of
the final administrative decisions. In addition, compliance with the doctrine
is excused in some circumstances even when authorized procedures have not
been followed. For example, "[w]here legal questions are presented which are
of the type traditionally determined by courts and there is no question
involving underlying administrative expertise no exhaustion of administrative
remedy is required."32
Direct judicial review is also allowed when the agency is a participant in
an issue. For instance, a person may appeal directly to the courts with claims
that an agency has exceeded its authority. The exhaustion doctrine does not
apply when an administrative agency has violated established rights or has
breached a legal duty owed to the individual.33 Also, an individual will not
be forced to comply with an administrative procedure if the validity of the
remedy itself is challenged.'M
The goals of the exhaustion doctrine generally do not apply when an
administrative agency or remedy is the source of an individual's contention.
An agency that is a party in an action would find it difficult to render an
impartial decision. Similarly, forcing resort to a challenged remedy is unlikely
to produce a favorable outcome to the claimant and may even worsen the
injury. Because judicial review certainly will be sought in either situation,
administrative efficiency is not increased. Consequently, when an agency or
remedy causes the alleged injury, the exhaustion doctrine should be excused
to allow the court to act as an impartial decision maker. Tort and fraud claims
are examples of traditional issues where courts retain primary jurisdiction
when one of the parties is an administrative agency.
Direct judicial action also may be taken when a controversy between an
agency and an individual involves only questions of law rather than questions
of fact. 35 When questions of fact are not in dispute, a court can resolve the
issue without relying on agency expertise or risking encroachment on the
agency's autonomy. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concisely
explained this form of agency subjection to the court system, noting that the
exhaustion doctrine did not apply when: (1) the agency has clearly violated a
right secured by statute or agency regulation; (2) the issue involved is a strictly
legal one and not involving the agency's expertise or any factual
determination; or (3) the issue cannot be raised upon judicial review of a later
order of the agency.36

32. Lee County Sch. Dist. Number One v. Gardner, 263 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D.S.C. 1967).
33. Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1978).
34. Winterberger v. General Teamsters Auto Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union 162,
558 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1977).
35. See W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 299 U.S. 393
(1937).
36. FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).'
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Furthermore, an individual may resort directly to the courts when
exhausting administrative remedies would be futile.37 Several factors may
render administrative procedures ineffective. For instance, administrative
remedies are inadequate when the agency demonstrates bias or decides an issue
before an individual begins the administrative process.38 The exhaustion
requirement also may be excused if the individual will suffer irreversible harm
before exhausting administrative remedies.39 In addition, the goals of the
exhaustion doctrine are not served when the agency lacks either the authority
to act or the ability to provide adequate relief. 4 Finally, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is inappropriate when constitutional rights are
violated and administrative recourse can not afford protection.4'
Courts have generally reserved the right to excuse the exhaustion
requirement according to their own judicial discretion, justifying circumvention
of the doctrine on various principles such as the interests of justice, the need
to correct an emergency, or the existence of undefined exceptional circumstances. 42 Judicial discretion gives courts the flexibility to bypass the
exhaustion requirement based on the specific facts of each case. Indeed, at the
43
outset the Hyde decision recognizes the need to protect judicial discretion.
By requiring, however, that the trial judge have a sound basis for excusing
exhaustion Hyde may have the effect of limiting the scope of judicial
discretion. As the Hyde court put it, because the trial judge "found no
exception to excuse the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, his decision
striking [the agency defense that administrative remedies had not been
exhausted] was controlled by an error of law."" Thus, under the Hyde
standard, when the statute is silent regarding exhaustion, a party seeking
access to the courts may be unable to prevail unless that party can point to a
specific, well-established exception to the exhaustion doctrine.
Kevin W. Reese

37. Cafferello v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 625 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1980).
38. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
39. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) (allowing court action when Social
Security procedure would have caused delay and increased illness).
40. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
41. Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985).
42. Vaught v. Waites, 300 S.C. 201, 387 S.E.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1989).
43. Hyde v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, _ S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 582 (1994).
44. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 583.
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